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CHEVRON VS. STARE DECISIS: SHOULD 
CIRCUIT COURTS FOLLOW JUDICIAL 
PRECEDENT OR DEFER TO AGENCIES AS 
MANDATED IN CHEVRON U.S.A., INC. V. NRDC? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No one disputes Justice Marshall’s declaration that the role of the 
courts is to “say what the law is.”1 In the 1984 case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, however, the Supreme Court 
announced a doctrine that shares some of that responsibility with 
administrative agencies.2 The Supreme Court stated that courts must defer 
to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their enabling statutes.3 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court modified its own position with respect 
to this doctrine by holding that it is not required to defer to agencies.4 In 
these subsequent cases, however, the Court did not address the proper 
resolution when circuit courts of appeals face conflicting circuit precedent 
and agency statutory interpretations. 
The Court’s silence has led to conflict among, and within, the federal 
circuits. Although the Court’s silence might imply that the Chevron 
doctrine has not been altered with respect to lower federal courts and they 
should defer to agencies, not all courts have embraced this implication. 
Some courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead and adhere to circuit 
precedent despite a contrary agency interpretation.5 Other courts do 
embrace this implication and defer to agencies despite conflicting circuit 
precedent.6 The courts’ varying interpretations have the potential to defeat 
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
 2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). At issue in Chevron was the definition of “stationary source” for 
purposes of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 840. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had vacillated 
between definitions. Id. at 845-59. At one point the court of appeals adopted a particular definition that 
the EPA had used. Id. at 841. This judicial adoption made the definition static. Id. at 842. The Supreme 
Court noted that the court of appeals’ “basic legal error” was to make the definition static when 
Congress meant for it to be flexible. Id. at 842, 846. The Court held that judicial courts should defer to 
an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute when the interpretation “centers on the wisdom of the 
agency’s policy[.]” Id. at 866. 
 3. Id. at 844. 
 4. See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (holding Supreme Court not 
required to defer to agency statutory interpretations); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 
(1992) (same); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990) (same). 
 5. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); BPS Guard Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 942 F.2d 519, 524 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 6. See, e.g., Aguirre v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996); 
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the foundation of our judicial system: to treat similar cases similarly.7 The 
most efficient resolution of this conflict is for the lower federal courts to 
defer consistently to agency interpretations of their enabling statutes in the 
absence of Supreme Court precedent. 
Part II of this Note explains how the Supreme Court itself has modified 
the Chevron doctrine with respect to its own deference to agency 
interpretations and examines the lower courts’ responses. Part III analyzes 
the various approaches taken by the circuits and notes a pattern in the 
application of one doctrine or the other. Finally, Part IV suggests a 
resolution to the conflict between stare decisis and the Chevron doctrine. 
II. HISTORY 
Traditionally, federal courts were the authority on matters of statutory 
construction.8 The courts were not required to defer to agency 
interpretations of their enabling statutes.9 In Chevron, Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, however, the Supreme Court altered this 
arrangement by requiring such deference from courts.10  
The Court supported its decision to increase federal agencies’ authority 
with strong policy concerns.11 The Court recognized that agencies are the 
experts in their fields and allowing them to make decisions regarding their 
regulatory systems promotes efficiency within the agency.12 The Court 
also implicitly acknowledged that federal agencies have national 
jurisdiction and thus their pronouncements are nationally uniform,13 
whereas if the lower courts followed circuit precedent, different circuits 
could obtain different results.14  
Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1993); NLRB v. Viola Industries–Elevator Division, Inc., 
979 F.2d 1384, 1394 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 855 (3d Cir. 
1992), rev’d on other grounds, Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993); Mesa Verde Constr. Co. 
v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
 7. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 8-
12 (3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter LOGIC FOR LAWYERS] (describing the origins of stare decisis and the 
process of applying the same law to similar fact patterns). 
 8. Richard L. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2225 
(1997) [hereinafter Reconciling]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 11. Id. at 844, 858, 864. 
 12. Id. at 844. 
 13. Id. at 858, 864. The Court nowhere expressly articulated this concern, but its awareness of it 
is evident. The Court acknowledges the EPA’s struggle to achieve uniformity of definition to decrease 
“confusion and inconsistency.” Id. at 858. The Court is also aware that some jurisdictions will adopt 
the agency’s definition while others will not if deference is not mandated. Id. at 864. 
 14. Id. at 864. 
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The Court developed a two-step process for resolving conflicts of 
statutory construction.15 The first step involves determining whether 
Congress meant to confer authority on the agency to decide the issue; the 
second step is to determine whether the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable.16 The Court broke from tradition by requiring federal courts to 
defer to agencies’ constructions of their enabling statutes rather than 
follow controlling judicial precedent,17 but it preserved the function of the 
judiciary in determining whether the statute at issue is ambiguous, and if 
not ambiguous, whether it is both reasonable and within the agency’s 
congressionally defined scope of authority.18 The Court’s language in 
Chevron reveals a determination to empower federal agencies through 
judicial deference.19 
A. Subsequent Supreme Court Actions 
Several years after announcing the Chevron doctrine, the Court 
modified it with respect to its own deference requirements.20 In Lechmere, 
Inc. v. NLRB, the Court held that its own prior decisions prevail over 
 15. Id. at 842-43. The Court described the process as follows: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the 
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute. 
(footnotes omitted).  
 16. The first step in the Chevron analysis is to determine whether Congress has expressed its 
intent with regard to the specific topic at issue. Id. at 842. If Congress has expressed its intent either to 
delegate interpretive authority to the agency or not to, the agency and the court must respect that 
intent. Id. at 843. Moreover, congressional silence is to be interpreted as a grant of such power that 
commands deference. Id. at 844. See also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833-34 (2001) [hereinafter Chevron’s Domain] (discussing express and 
implied delegations). 
 17. 467 U.S. at 843-44 (reasoning that agency decisions necessarily involve formulating policy 
and recognizing the long-standing tradition of according “controlling weight” to agency constructions 
of statutes). 
 18. Id. at 843 n.9 (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction. . . .”). 
 19. Id. at 866 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly 
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a 
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”). 
 20. Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 536-37. Lechmere clarifies the relationship between employer’s 
property rights with employee’s rights to self-organize under section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act. Id. at 529. 
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subsequent agency statutory interpretations.21 Although Lechmere stated 
that the Supreme Court need not defer to agency interpretations, it neither 
discussed its reasoning for adhering to stare decisis nor addressed the 
appropriate level of deference from lower federal courts.22 Thus, at the 
Supreme Court level, the doctrine of stare decisis takes priority over the 
Chevron doctrine.23  
A few years after Lechmere, the Court reaffirmed its position that, at 
the highest level, stare decisis is the rule.24 In Neal v. United States, the 
Court added support for its refusal to defer.25 The Court acknowledged 
that Congress has the power to change a statute if the Court’s 
interpretation is not what Congress intended.26 The Court maintained that 
if it constantly changed its own statutory construction in deference to an 
agency, Congress would have an incentive not to change the statute.27 
Moreover, the Court noted the difference between agencies and the 
judiciary: agencies make policy judgments and can abandon old methods 
 21. Id. at 536-37 (“‘Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that 
determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the 
statute against our prior determination of the statute’s meaning.’”) (quoting Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 
131). 
 Lower federal courts do not interpret this decision uniformly. Some courts have held that if the 
controlling opinion deferred to the agency’s interpretation, then the judicial precedent is not final and 
the agency may change its interpretation with a continued expectation of judicial deference. See, e.g., 
Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1393; Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1129. See also infra Part II.B.1.b. 
Other courts have adopted the Supreme Court’s practice by giving circuit court precedent higher 
priority than agency interpretations. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376; BPS 
Guard Services, Inc., 942 F.2d at 524. See also infra Part II.B.2. 
 22. 502 U.S. at 536-37. 
 23. Id. The dissenting opinion in Lechmere raised a strong argument that runs contrary to the 
Court’s opinion. The dissent understood the Chevron doctrine to prioritize judicial deference over stare 
decisis. Id. at 547 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent explained in Chevron’s own language that the 
Court’s failure to defer to the agency freezes the law when Congress did not mean for the law to be 
frozen. Id. (“The more basic legal error of the majority today . . . is to adopt a static judicial 
construction of the statute when Congress has not commanded that construction.”). The dissent 
supported its proposition by noting that Congress left the question open in the statute, thereby 
delegating authority to the agency to interpret the statute. Id. The dissent further stated that the Court 
should respect Congress’ delegation and not use its own interpretation of the statute in place of the 
agency’s reasonable interpretation. Id. 
 24. Neal, 516 U.S. at 290, 295. Neal addressed a discrepancy between the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) and the minimum sentence statute. Id. at 286. At the time of 
conviction, the Guidelines and statute were uniform, but the Sentencing Commission later 
retroactively revised the Guidelines. Id. at 287. If they controlled, Neal’s sentence would be reduced. 
Id. The Court held, however, that because it had previously construed the minimum sentence statute, 
stare decisis commanded that the statute, rather than the Guidelines, control Neal’s sentence. Id. at 
289-91. 
 25. Id. at 295-96. 
 26. Id. at 295. 
 27. Id. at 296. Implicit in the Court’s opinion is that for the Court to change judicial statutory 
constructions would obstruct the proper functioning of the separate branches of government. See id. 
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as more desirable methods are realized, whereas the judiciary is limited in 
its ability to change a prior statutory construction.28 Again, the Court left 
lower courts’ position with regard to the Chevron doctrine unaddressed. 
The Supreme Court’s exemption from deference is not the only 
exception to the Chevron doctrine; several other exceptions exist.29 
Although these exceptions are beyond the scope of this Note, one in 
particular deserves mention. The Supreme Court has limited the situations 
to which Chevron applies by requiring deference to agencies only when 
their pronouncements carry the force of law.30 Even though the line 
between pronouncements with the force of law and those without is 
evolving,31 many situations continue to arise in which Chevron is 
applicable.32 It is these situations that this Note addresses. 
B. Subsequent Courts of Appeals Actions 
Since Chevron, the Supreme Court has not expressly discussed the 
appropriate level of deference for circuit courts of appeals when agency 
statutory interpretations conflict with circuit precedent. Consequently, the 
circuits, and courts within circuits, have split on whether to follow the 
Court’s Chevron mandate and defer to agencies or to follow the Supreme 
Court’s own practice established in later decisions and adhere to stare 
decisis.33 Foreseeably, two major approaches have emerged: Some courts 
follow Chevron;34 other courts adhere to stare decisis.35 
 28. Id. at 295. Ironically, Chevron cited this distinction as a reason for deferring to agencies. 467 
U.S. at 865. 
 29. See generally Chevron’s Domain, supra note 16. 
 30. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). Mead applies to lower courts and 
limits the breadth but not the depth of deference required once it has been determined that Chevron 
deference is appropriate. See id. at 229-30. Although the Court did not compel deference to agency 
pronouncements without the force of law, it articulated a lower standard of deference for courts to 
follow. Id. at 228, 234-35. 
 31. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218-19 (2002). In Barnhart, the Court reaffirmed Mead 
and encouraged judicial deference to agency interpretations based on several factors. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 42 (2002) (applying Chevron 
doctrine to Interstate Commerce Commission standards); Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Chevron analysis to agency action). 
 33. This Note addresses the situations in which a circuit court of appeals faces a conflict between 
an agency interpretation and circuit precedent that interprets the same statute. Although some circuits 
have circumvented Supreme Court precedent under the guise of adhering to the Chevron doctrine, this 
practice is incorrect. See Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1393-94; Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 
1129-31. See also infra, note 66. Supreme Court decisions bind the lower courts despite contrary 
agency interpretations. See, e.g., Neal, 516 U.S. at 295; Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 537-37. 
 34. See, e.g., In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001); NLRB v. 
Advanced Stretchforming Int’l, Inc., 233 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2000); Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 
1393-94; Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1129. 
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1. Following the Chevron Doctrine 
Several courts follow Chevron and defer to agencies despite conflicting 
circuit precedent. Some courts do so without discussion;36 others expressly 
embrace one or more of the policy considerations underlying Chevron.37 
To follow Chevron without discussing the reason for deference might 
imply that, in Chevron, the Supreme Court abrogated circuit precedent 
decided without deference to the agency.38 This implication leads to the 
conclusion that pre-Chevron decisions are of no legal consequence.39 The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to properly enacted agency 
regulations despite conflicting circuit precedent.40 The court held that so 
long as the agency observed proper administrative procedures,41 its 
regulations are within the agency’s scope of authority,42 and the 
regulations are not arbitrary or capricious,43 the regulations are binding on 
the court.44 The court stated that it had no choice but to uphold the 
agency’s interpretation;45 “[a]ny other conclusion would result in . . . 
chaos. . . .”46 
Other courts explain their reasons for deferring to agencies. Some 
express sensitivity to the policy considerations that motivated Chevron: 
promoting uniformity or exploiting agency expertise.47 Others 
acknowledge these policy concerns, but seem to defer to agencies 
 35. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376; BPS Guard Services, Inc., 942 
F.2d at 524. 
 36. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 873 F.2d 1477, 1481-82 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989). 
 37. See Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317 (uniformity); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855 (agency expertise); Viola 
Indus., 979 F.2d at 1393 (deferential precedent); Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1135-36 
(judicial economy and efficiency). 
 38. E.g., Michel v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 206 F.3d 253, 268 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(Cabranes, J., concurring) (“Where, as in this case, one of our previous decisions has plainly been 
abrogated by the Supreme Court, I do not believe we are required to seek approval of all of the active 
judges of the court to state as much.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). For a shortcoming in 
this theory, see infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
 39. E.g., Michel, 206 F.3d at 268 n.2 (Cabranes, J., concurring). 
 40. Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1993). Schisler addressed Health and 
Human Service regulations that enacted a version of the “treating physician rule” that differed from the 
circuit’s traditional version of the rule. Id. 
 41. Id. at 568. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 568. 
 45. Id. at 569. 
 46. Id. at 568. 
 47. See, e.g., Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317; Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855. 
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primarily because the controlling opinion was decided in deference to the 
agency.48 
a. Policy Considerations 
Some courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes at the expense 
of circuit precedent with the goal of achieving national uniformity in 
application of the statute.49 The courts that aim to achieve uniformity 
recognize a foundation of our judicial system—to treat similar cases 
similarly.50 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit abandoned circuit 
precedent in favor of creating uniform application of the immigration 
laws.51 Caught in a conflict between its prior judicial interpretation of a 
section of the Immigration Nationality Act and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service’s differing interpretation,52 the court concluded that 
“nationwide uniformity outweigh[s] . . . adherence to Circuit precedent in 
this instance.”53 The Second Circuit reasoned that it was especially 
important to defer to the agency when the same action would lead to 
different results in different jurisdictions.54 Accordingly, the court felt it 
was particularly important to defer to the INS when considering an issue 
that directly affects immigrants.55 
Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has abandoned circuit 
precedent and deferred to agencies in the interest of uniformity.56 In the 
 48. See, e.g., Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1128-29; Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1135-36. 
 49. See Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317 (expressing the importance of uniformity in treating similarly 
situated immigrants similarly within the law of immigration); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855 (recognizing 
that deference “tends to promote uniformity in the application of the statute”); Mesa Verde Constr. 
Co., 861 F.2d at 1135-36 (explaining that stare decisis prevents agencies from “enacting consistent, 
nationwide policies”). 
 50. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 7, at 8-12 (explaining common law tradition of 
creating a judicial rule and then using that rule to decide future cases that have the same or similar fact 
patterns). 
 51. Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317. Aguirre addressed a conflict between the Immigration and 
Naturalization’s (INS) definition of “aggravated felony” for purposes of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) and circuit precedent’s definition of aggravated felony. Id. at 316. 
 52. The INA is the INS’s enabling statute. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101-1537 (2000). 
 This Note addresses only the practice of deference to an agency when it interprets a section of its 
enabling statute. Deference to an agency that interprets sections of statutes other than one it is charged 
with administering is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 53. Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317. The court felt it had a choice in whether it deferred to the agency or 
adhered to its own precedent. Id. The court cited Chevron and stated that although agencies are entitled 
to deference in some situations, the Chevron doctrine “cannot compel a court to forgo the principle of 
stare decisis and abandon a construction previously made.” Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 
 56. In United States v. Joshua, the court considered clarifications made by the Sentencing 
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context of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the court implicitly 
recognized that, as with immigrants, criminals convicted for similar crimes 
should not receive different sentences depending on the geographic 
location of their actions.57 These courts deferred to agency statutory 
interpretations with the intent of creating uniform application of the laws.58 
The courts that recognize the importance of uniformity fulfill a 
fundamental objective of our legal system by treating similar cases 
similarly, especially when the outcome directly impacts an individual’s 
liberty interest.59 
Agency expertise is another reason courts defer to agencies at the 
expense of circuit precedent.60 This rationale recognizes a purpose of 
agencies: to make a complex regulatory system function as smoothly and 
efficiently as possible.61 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, 
has deferred to an agency statutory interpretation at the expense of circuit 
precedent to exploit agency expertise.62 On a matter that involved pre-hire 
agreements between a union and an employer, the court determined that 
the NLRB merited deference because of its detailed knowledge of the 
regulatory scheme.63 The court decided that the NLRB’s superior 
knowledge enabled it to interpret individual sections of the NLRA in a 
manner that promotes the agency’s overall purpose.64 Thus, respect for 
agencies’ statutory interpretations best effects the efficient functioning of 
the regulatory system and serves the purpose of establishing the agency.65 
Commission in the form of commentary on the Sentencing Guidelines. 976 F.2d at 855. The court 
ultimately deferred to the Commission but stated that when a prior circuit court panel’s construction of 
a statute differs from the agency’s construction of the same statute, the court is not compelled by stare 
decisis to adhere to the judicial construction, but neither is it “bound to close its eyes to the new source 
of enlightenment.” Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317; Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855.  
 59. LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 7, at 8-12; cf. Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2234 (implying 
necessity of the Chevron doctrine because courts were at risk for treating similar cases dissimilarly). 
 60. Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855 (acknowledging that judicial deference to the agency secures full use 
of the agency’s knowledge and expertise); Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1135 (recognizing that 
deference is especially important when “‘a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the 
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge’”) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)). 
 61. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 219 (2002) (recognizing “the importance of the question to the 
administration of the statute, [and] the complexity of that administration”); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-
65 (noting the necessity of technical expertise). 
 62. Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1135. 
 63. Id. at 1128, 1135. Specifically at issue was the timing and ability of the union or employer to 
unilaterally repudiate a pre-hire contract. Id. at 1127-28. 
 64. Id. at 1135. 
 65. Id. 
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b. Deferential Precedent 
Some courts defer to agency statutory interpretations when the court 
that issued the controlling judicial decision deferred to the agency.66 In 
these cases, if the “original court” deferred to the agency’s interpretation,67 
the subsequent court respects stare decisis to the extent that it defers to the 
agency’s interpretation.68 This method is viable when the statute at issue 
supports more than one reasonable interpretation.69 If the original court 
deferred to the agency, the subsequent court need only consider whether 
the current agency interpretation is reasonable.70 
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have followed 
this practice.71 The subsequent court has deferred to the agency’s statutory 
interpretation when the original court deferred to the agency.72 Such 
deference is allowable even if the agency has changed its interpretation 
and deference entails overruling judicial precedent.73 In announcing their 
 66. E.g., Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1393-94; Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1128-29. These 
circuits deferred to the agency’s interpretation despite not only conflicting circuit precedent, but also 
conflicting Supreme Court precedent. 979 F.2d at 1393-94; 861 F.2d at 1128-29. Once these courts 
dispensed with Supreme Court precedent, however, they were left with circuit precedents that 
conflicted with the agency interpretation. 979 F.2d at 1393-94; 861 F.2d at 1128-29. Because it is 
inappropriate for circuit courts not to follow Supreme Court opinions, see supra notes 21, 33, this Note 
addresses the conflict with circuit, rather than Supreme Court, precedent. 
 67. Throughout this Note, the author will use the phrase “original court” to refer to the circuit 
court that drafted the precedential decision on the issue at hand. The phrase “subsequent court” will be 
used to indicate the court that considered the issue in light of both the agency’s interpretation and the 
original court’s decision. 
 68. See Michel, 206 F.3d at 262 (implying that the subsequent court would be bound by stare 
decisis to follow an original court’s statutory interpretation made without deference to the agency). See 
also Chevron’s Domain, supra note 16, at 916 (“[T]he previous judicial decision should not be given 
full stare decisis effect in fixing the meaning of the statute. Instead, it should be given stare decisis 
effect only for the proposition that the statute admits of multiple interpretations. . . .”). 
 69. Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1136. See also Chevron’s Domain, supra note 16, at 
916-17 (“The fact that the court upheld (or invalidated) the agency’s prior construction of the statute 
would not, however, be determinative in deciding whether the current interpretation is permissible.”). 
 70. Chevron’s Domain, supra note 16, at 916. See also Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 
supra note 8, at 2260. 
 71. Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1128-29; Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1135-36. 
 72. 979 F.2d at 1393-94; 861 F.2d at 1136. But cf. TCI West, Inc., v. NLRB, 145 F.3d 1113, 
1116-17 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that subsequent court need not defer to agency’s statutory 
interpretation if original court did not exercise such deference). See also infra note 129. 
 73. Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1136. In this case, the NLRB vacillated between 
positions with respect to unilateral repudiation of pre-hire agreements. Id. at 1128. Both the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court enforced the NLRB’s interpretation that 
pre-hire contracts could be unilaterally repudiated. Id. The NLRB changed its interpretation prior to 
Mesa Verde. Id. Thus, the court faced opposing statutory interpretations, with the NLRB on one side 
and circuit and Supreme Court precedent on the other. Id. Although the circuit court’s circumvention 
of Supreme Court precedent is plainly unacceptable, see supra notes 21, 33, the court also faced circuit 
precedent. It is this portion of the court’s analysis that this Note considers. 
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decisions, the courts explained that the original courts had not judicially 
construed the statute, but rather had deferred to the agency’s construction 
of the statute.74 Because the original courts did not construe the statute, 
they did not make binding judicial constructions; therefore, they could not 
compel the subsequent courts to enforce the same interpretation.75 
The Ninth Circuit supported its decision with several policy 
considerations.76 In addition to achieving uniformity and exploiting 
agency expertise, the court reasoned that consistent deference to agencies 
would promote judicial economy and efficiency.77 The Ninth Circuit 
explained that deference to the agency and an accompanying ability to 
overrule judicial precedent promote judicial economy by reducing 
superfluous appeals.78 When litigants are certain that the court will defer to 
 The Tenth Circuit adopted the same theory. 979 F.2d at 1393-94. Rather than analyze circuit and 
Supreme Court precedent separately, however, it simply relied on the fact that the circuit court 
opinions relied on the Supreme Court cases. Id. The Supreme Court apparently did not independently 
construe the statutes, so the circuit court determined they were not binding. Id. Because the circuit 
court precedents relied on the Supreme Court decisions and did not construe the statutes, the same 
analysis is applicable to circuit court precedent. 
 The Tenth Circuit also reached a sensitive issue related to application of the Chevron doctrine. 
After the court determined that the NLRB’s current interpretation was reasonable and therefore 
commanded deference, it considered whether the new interpretation should be applied retroactively to 
an employer who repudiated the contract in reliance on the law as it was at the time of action. Id. at 
1396. The court decided that retroactive application, in this case, was proper because there would be 
no “manifest injustice.” Id. This threat is a major drawback to the Chevron doctrine. Retroactivity is an 
important consideration in resolving the stare decisis–Chevron conflict. Unfortunately a detailed 
discussion of retroactivity is beyond the scope of this Note but see infra note 143 for a brief discussion 
of retroactivity. 
 74. 979 F.2d at 1393; 861 F.2d at 1134. 
 75. 979 F.2d at 1394; 861 F.2d at 1130, 1134-35. These cases present an example of how overly 
strong adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis can be destructive to an agency. In this case, the 
NLRB changed its interpretation of § 8(f) periodically. 861 F.2d at 1128. Had the issue reached the 
courts of appeals either later or earlier in time, when the Board interpreted the statute not to allow 
unilateral repudiation, id., the cases would have been different. 
 The point at which an agency’s interpretation of its statute obtains judicial review is arbitrary and 
depends only on the litigants’ desire (or not) to pursue their remedy. Accordingly, to hold that a court’s 
enforcement of an agency’s statutory construction at a particular point in time makes that 
interpretation the only one possible, prevents the agency’s ability to function properly. Id. at 1135-36. 
The situation is further complicated when one circuit reviews and enforces a particular agency 
interpretation, while another circuit enforces a different interpretation. Id. The agency itself would 
have to enforce different laws, depending on the circuit. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1135-36. 
 77. Id. See also supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial uniformity 
and agency expertise. 
 78. Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1136. If litigants are uncertain as to whether the court 
will ultimately defer to the agency or follow judicial precedent, they are more likely to pursue an 
appeal to the court of appeals, and then to the court en banc, with hopes that the court en banc will 
adopt the agency’s interpretation. Id. The court stated that the panel’s consistent adoption of agency 
interpretations increases the certainty of the law and thereby reduces appeals. Id. Litigants who want a 
change in the law applied by the court would be required to pursue an appeal all the way to the United 
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agency interpretations, they will not appeal with false hopes that the court 
will adhere to stare decisis.79 Furthermore, by allowing a subsequent panel 
of the court of appeals to overrule a prior panel’s decision—so long as 
both panels’ decisions defer to a reasonable agency statutory 
interpretation—the inherent need for an en banc review is eliminated.80 
The court noted that requiring an en banc review of a decision every time a 
panel defers to an agency’s statutory interpretation is infeasible and could 
preclude the circuit court of appeals from adopting the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute.81  
In conclusion, courts that afford Chevron deference to federal agencies 
generally do so in recognition of the policy concerns underlying Chevron. 
Some courts, however, defer to agency interpretations because the 
controlling judicial decision deferred. This type of analysis respects stare 
decisis to the extent that the subsequent court’s decision is consistent with 
that of the original court.82 
2. Following Stare Decisis 
Stare decisis maintains a prominent position in circuit court opinions 
despite the Court’s Chevron mandate. Several courts do not defer to 
agencies but rather follow judicial precedent regardless of the agency’s 
statutory interpretation.83 Some courts hold that the law as stated by the 
court is binding, and later courts do not have authority to change that law 
even in deference to an agency interpretation of its enabling statute.84 
Other courts take this understanding further.85 These courts suggest that 
States Supreme Court. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. If the law mandates that the court defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of its 
enabling statute, the litigants will not need to pursue an appeal to determine what the appropriate law 
is. Id. Rather, they will know judicial deference is proper, the panel will have the authority to defer, 
and the court en banc need not review the panel’s decision. Id. 
 81. Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1136. This is true because the time constraints of the 
court do not allow for an en banc review of every panel decision. Id. It is possible that the panel’s 
decision would not be reviewed en banc, thereby precluding the panel from departing from the 
previous interpretation and adopting the agency’s current interpretation. Id. 
 82. See Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2260 (proposing that courts first examine the controlling 
cases to determine whether the original court deferred to the agency: if so, then the subsequent court 
should follow its lead and defer to the agency’s current interpretation, even if it differs from the 
interpretation in the controlling case; if not, the court should reconsider that precedent in light of 
Chevron and in light of current circumstances in the agency and society). 
 83. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376; BPS Guard Services, Inc., 942 
F.2d at 524. 
 84. BPS Guard Services, Inc., 942 F.2d at 523. 
 85. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1375-76. 
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judicial deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation violates the 
separation of powers doctrine.86 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Chevron doctrine in 
favor of stare decisis.87 In BPS Guard Services, Inc., the NLRB argued 
that because the court was bound by Chevron, it must defer to the agency’s 
construction of the National Labor Relations Act, so long as its 
construction was reasonable.88 Even though the court agreed with the 
NLRB’s “statements of law,”89 it found “them inapplicable to the situation 
before [it].”90 The court suggested that the NLRB should have made its 
Chevron argument during the original court of appeals case,91 before the 
court’s decision became “binding precedent.”92 The court strongly stated 
its interpretation of the Chevron doctrine: “Chevron does not stand for the 
proposition that administrative agencies may reject, with impunity, the 
controlling precedent of a superior judicial body.”93 The court stated that 
its prior decision on the issue is binding law—binding on all courts and 
litigants in the circuit.94 According to the court, a judicial statement is 
binding law and disagreement from the NLRB carries no legal 
consequences.95 
 86. Id. at 1376. 
 87. BPS Guard Services, Inc., 942 F.2d at 523. 
 88. Id. At issue was whether BPS Guard Service’s firefighters qualified as “guards” within the 
meaning of § 9(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 521. 
 89. Id. at 523. 
 90. Id. The NLRB originally construed § 9(b)(3) of the NLRA not to include BPS’s firefighters 
within the meaning of “guards.” Id. at 521. The court, reviewing the Board’s decision, disagreed with 
the Board and held that the firefighters were guards for purposes of § 9(b)(3). Id. The Board 
disregarded the court’s holding and issued an order in accordance with its own finding that the 
firefighters did not qualify as guards. Id. at 522. Implicit in its order was a Chevron argument that the 
court’s decision was invalid because it “conflicted with Board precedent.” Id. The instant action was 
BPS’s response to the Board’s order. Id. at 523. 
 91. Id. at 523-24. Other courts of appeals have entertained the idea that agencies have the 
opportunity to challenge the court’s holding before it becomes binding law and that if they do not 
exercise this right they lose their entitlement to deference. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ 
Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 92. BPS Guard Services, Inc., 942 F.2d at 524. See also Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc., 
260 F.3d at 1373 (noting agency’s failure to challenge the court’s decision before it became binding 
law). 
 93. BPS Guard Services, Inc., 942 F.2d at 523. 
 94. Id. at 524. 
 95. Id. The court of appeals emphasized its understanding of the appropriate positions of the 
judiciary and agencies. Id. In its opinion, the court stated that its decision 
is the final decision of the court of last resort in this federal circuit . . . It is the law of the 
circuit, . . . and its holding on this issue is binding on all inferior courts and litigants in the 
[Eighth Circuit], including administrative agencies dealing with matters pertaining to this 
circuit. Furthermore, because Congress has not given to the NLRB the power or authority to 
disagree, respectfully or otherwise, with decisions of this court, the Board’s disagreement 
with [our decision] is of no legal consequence in this circuit. [Our decision] sets forth the law 
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also rejected the Chevron 
doctrine by holding that judicial deference to agencies violates the 
separation of powers doctrine.96 In a case involving the Internal Revenue 
Service, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that because it 
was bound by circuit precedent, it could not follow Treasury Regulations 
to the contrary.97 The court reasoned that it would violate the separation of 
powers for an agency to construe a statute in a manner inconsistent with a 
“prior definitive court ruling” on the issue.98 The court denied any conflict 
between the Chevron doctrine and stare decisis.99 The court stated that 
Chevron, “properly understood,” is a “gap-filling” doctrine.100 It explained 
that Chevron requires deference to reasonable agency interpretations only 
when there is a gap to be filled.101 In the case under consideration, because 
the court of appeals had previously ruled on the same issue, the court 
found that no gap existed.102 Therefore, Chevron was inapplicable.103 The 
court implied that because it was bound by stare decisis, it could not defer 
to the Treasury Regulations even if deference was preferable.104 
In further support of its decision not to defer to the agency, the court 
cited Marbury v. Madison for the “fundamental principle of Constitutional 
of this circuit, and for the Board to predicate orders on its disagreement with [our decision] is 
for it to operate outside the law. 
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 96. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376. This case confronted conflicting agency 
and circuit interpretations regarding the availability of a foreign tax credit. Id. at 1369. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. Although the court did not express exactly what kind of “gap” it was referring to, it 
implied that courts are only required to defer to agency interpretations when either the circuit itself or 
Congress has not already decided the issue. See id. In Chevron, the Court itself did use the term “gap,” 
but clearly used it in reference to a gap left in the statute by Congress, not a gap left in the law by the 
courts. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. See also supra note 19. 
 102. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. Interestingly, although the court was firm in its decision not to defer to the agency and 
offered several reasons why it is inappropriate for a court to defer to an agency, id., the court hinted 
that it would have readily deferred to the agency if the precedential case had been decided in deference 
to the agency, instead of being a direct judicial construction of the statute. Id. at 1374. Although dicta, 
this analysis resembles the analysis adopted by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in Mesa Verde 
Construction Company and Viola Industries, respectively. See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying 
text. A subsequent panel in the Federal Circuit has also attached significance to this language in 
Bankers Trust New York Corporation. Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc., 260 F.3d at 1374 n.7 
(“Bankers Trust made clear that our obligation to follow earlier decisions of this court need not apply 
at all when those earlier decisions are based on deference to the agency.”) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Although not part of the holding, this statement displays potential for the Federal 
Circuit to change its position in the conflict between stare decisis and Chevron deference. 
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law”105 that “‘[i]t is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial 
department, to say what the law is.’”106 The court reasoned that in 
executing its judicial duty of saying what the law is, it could not give 
agencies power that not even subsequent panels of the court have: the 
power to overrule an “established statutory construction.”107 According to 
the court, vesting a judicial power in an agency, especially a power that 
the court itself does not have, violates the separation of powers.108 The 
Federal Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Neal for the position that once a statute has been judicially interpreted, 
subsequent agency interpretations are assessed against that “‘settled 
law.’”109 The court construed Neal to hold that once a circuit court has 
determined the meaning of a statute, an agency cannot change that 
meaning in a manner that is inconsistent with the prior judicial 
construction.110 
In light of the Supreme Court’s change in the Chevron doctrine with 
respect to itself, and its silence on how circuit courts of appeals should 
resolve the conflict between circuit precedent and contrary agency 
statutory interpretations, the federal circuits are not in agreement. Some 
courts follow Chevron while others respect stare decisis. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In the absence of clear guidance, some circuit courts follow stare 
decisis while others defer to agency statutory interpretations.111 Because 
both doctrines are useful and important, they both merit a place in the 
judicial system. Each doctrine has distinct advantages, and circuits have 
used different doctrines in different cases.112 Whether they adhere to stare 
 105. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376. 
 106. Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1375 (quoting Neal, 516 U.S. at 295). 
 110. Id. The court of appeals augmented the Supreme Court’s rationale. In Neal, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that if it misinterpreted a statute, Congress is able to change the statute. 516 U.S. at 
295-96. The court of appeals argued that this rationale is even stronger for the lower courts. Bankers 
Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1375. Only one check exists on the Supreme Court, but three 
checks exist on the courts of appeals: the court en banc, the Supreme Court, and Congress. Id. 
 Despite its strong reasoning, the court did recognize a shortcoming of its decision. Id. at 1376. The 
court realized that two other circuits have considered the same issue, but they deferred to the agency. 
Id. By adhering to stare decisis, the Federal Circuit created inconsistencies between the circuits. Id. 
Undaunted by this inconsistency, however, the court declared that it would “follow our precedent, and 
leave harmonization of the circuits to the Supreme Court and Congress.” Id. 
 111. See supra Part II.B. 
 
 112. Compare Aguirre, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (deferring to reasonable agency statutory 
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decisis or follow Chevron in a specific case, courts hesitate to adopt 
definitively one doctrine over the other.113 This hesitation may be a result 
of the different interests at stake in the cases.114 This analysis first explores 
the advantages to and shortcomings of each doctrine when used to resolve 
the conflict between circuit precedent and agency interpretations. It then 
examines courts’ reluctance to adopt one doctrine over the other and notes 
a pattern that has emerged from the judicial decisions. 
Application of the Chevron doctrine has several advantages over stare 
decisis when a court faces opposing circuit precedent and agency statutory 
interpretations. First, it does not completely defeat stare decisis because 
courts tend to at least acknowledge precedential judicial decisions in their 
determination of whether deference to the agency is appropriate.115 
Second, the Chevron doctrine maintains authority in both the agency and 
the court. Agencies have the authority to regulate their systems, and adjust 
that regulation as knowledge increases and new developments arise, 
without judicial interference that can freeze prior, out-dated statutory 
interpretations.116 At the same time, the judiciary has the authority to keep 
the agency within its congressionally defined bounds by determining 
whether the agency has exceeded the scope of its authority.117 A final 
interpretation), with United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1999) (adhering to 
stare decisis despite opportunity to apply Chevron doctrine). 
 113. See, e.g., Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317; Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855; Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1392; 
Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376. 
 114. For example, uniformity of the law has an overriding importance in a decision directly 
impacting a person’s liberty interest; but a decision impacting the functions of an interdependent 
regulatory scheme is important to be left to the agency. Compare Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317, and Joshua, 
976 F.2d at 855, with Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1392-93, and Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 
1135. 
 115. See, e.g., Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317 (“[A]n agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers, 
though entitled in some circumstances to deference as we decide upon the proper interpretation of such 
statutes . . . cannot compel a court to forgo the principle of stare decisis and abandon a construction 
previously made.”) (citations omitted); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855 (acknowledging court’s responsibility 
both to defer to agency and to respect stare decisis). See also Chevron’s Domain, supra note 16, at 
916. If the controlling decision deferred to a prior agency interpretation, the subsequent court gives it 
stare decisis effect to the extent that it deferred to the agency, but not to the extent of the specific 
agency interpretation previously upheld by the court. Id. This type of analysis leaves unanswered the 
question of what to do when the original court did not defer to the agency’s interpretation. 
Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2260, considers this situation. This question is also considered more fully 
below. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
 116. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 863-64. See also Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 547 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 117. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. For example, if an agency exercised interpretive powers not 
delegated to it by Congress or exceeded its delegated authority, the court’s responsibility is to strike 
the agency’s interpretation as exceeding its authority. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 314 F.3d 735, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding EPA exceeded scope of its congressionally 
defined authority). 
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advantage to the Chevron doctrine is that, when courts respect it rather 
than circuit precedent, the agency’s interpretation becomes nationally 
uniform at once, it need not await Supreme Court review.118 
The strengths of adhering to stare decisis despite a conflicting agency 
interpretation, although fewer in number than those of Chevron deference, 
are very powerful. Stare decisis creates consistency in the law,119 and it 
protects people’s reliance on the law.120 Statutory interpretations that are 
constantly subject to change, as would be true if courts definitively 
adopted the Chevron doctrine, defeat this fundamental characteristic of the 
judicial system.121 Consistency in the law protects actors in their reliance 
on the law as it was at the time they acted.122 This concern is especially 
important for individuals whose liberty is at stake, such as the immigrants 
and criminal defendants discussed earlier.123 
Notwithstanding their advantages, both doctrines also have 
shortcomings. The Chevron doctrine has two major deficiencies when 
applied at the expense of circuit precedent. First, Chevron deference has 
the potential to circumvent Supreme Court authority.124 The Court has 
made clear its position as the ultimate authority on all issues of statutory 
construction.125 As shown by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, Chevron 
deference is easily twisted and can be used to give only partial stare 
decisis effect to Supreme Court decisions and specifically not to its 
statutory interpretations.126 Lower courts that apply the Chevron doctrine 
in this manner depart from the Supreme Court’s order and intention.127 
 118. See, e.g., Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1135-36. 
 119. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 7, at 12. 
 120. See Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2258. 
 121. But see LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 7, at 8-17 (describing changing nature of law); 
ESKRIDGE, WILLIAM N., JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48-80 (1994) (arguing that 
statutory interpretation involves change and policy choices). 
 122. See Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2244-45 (explaining that agency decisionmaking protects 
reliance interests). 
 123. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. Although the alternate route, deference to the 
agency, does not necessarily work to the individual’s detriment, see, e.g., Aguirre, 79 F.3d 315, 
consistency is of paramount importance in this context because an actor may have acted differently 
under a different, or even uncertain, set of consequences. 
 124. See, e.g., Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1394; Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1129-30. See 
also supra note 73. 
 125. Neal, 516 U.S. at 295; Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 537; Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 131. 
 126. See, e.g., Viola Indus., 979 F.2d at 1393-94; Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1128-29. 
 127. See, e.g., Neal, 516 U.S. at 295; Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 537; Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 
131. This rationale not only distorts Supreme Court precedent, it also demands line-drawing depending 
on how definitively the Supreme Court has spoken. E.g., 979 F.2d at 1394. This approach is overly 
formalistic in the emphasis it places on the specific language the Court uses in its opinions. Further, 
this type of quasi-deference invites post-hoc determinations of precedent: If subsequent courts agree 
with the precedential decision, they can affirm it as binding precedent; if they do not agree with it, they 
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The second deficiency is that, as it is developing in the circuit courts, the 
Chevron doctrine does not address the situation in which the original court 
did not defer to the agency.128 The failure to address this situation leaves 
open the opportunity for a court to refuse to defer on the basis that the 
original court did not defer to the agency.129 
The major shortcoming of stare decisis, when circuit and agency 
interpretations conflict, is the very problem recognized by the Chevron 
Court: It locks the law into place when the law is meant to be dynamic.130 
Agencies are left at the courts’ mercy as to their ability to fine-tune 
statutory interpretations as their knowledge increases.131 Once a court 
affirms or re-interprets an agency’s construction of its statute, the agency 
cannot alter that interpretation.132 The court’s decision prevents the agency 
from fine-tuning its regulatory scheme by freezing the agency’s 
interpretation.133 The illogic of this type of analysis is emphasized by the 
arbitrariness of the point in time at which a court reviews the agency’s 
statutory interpretation.134 
can circumvent it by saying it was made in deference to an agency. This loose standard allows courts 
to bypass precedent without directly overruling it. 
 128. Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1136; cf. TCI West, Inc., 145 F.3d at 1116-17 (holding 
that a prior, non-deferential judicial opinion construing a section of the NLRA does not require 
deference from the subsequent court). See also supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text. 
 129. See TCI West, Inc., 145 F.3d at 1116-17. As the result of a disputed vote in a decertification 
election, TCI West refused to bargain with the union. Id. at 1114. When TCI West appealed the 
Board’s decision, the court of appeals faced conflicting circuit and agency interpretations of a section 
of the NLRA. Id. at 1115-17. The NLRB argued that the court of appeals was free to reject judicial 
precedent and follow the agency’s interpretation. Id. at 1117. The court disagreed. Id. It noted that the 
original court had not deferred to the agency’s interpretation, but rather had construed the statute itself. 
Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that it was bound by stare decisis to follow the judicial 
precedent. Id. 
 Other courts have noted this situation. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376 
(recognizing that a court is not required to defer if the original court did not defer and following 
judicial precedent at the expense of deference to a reasonable agency interpretation); Nat’l Org. of 
Veterans’ Advocates, Inc., 260 F.3d at 1374 n.9 (same).  
 130. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 863-64. 
 131. See, e.g., Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1135-36. 
 132. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376. 
 133. See Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d at 1135. See also Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 547 
(White, J., dissenting). This practice has a potential chilling effect on agencies. Due to the intricacy of 
complex regulatory systems, a change in one area of the system may require accommodating changes 
in other areas. Accordingly, the experts in the agency must have control over the entire system for it to 
work properly. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 (noting agency’s control allows it flexibility). Contrary 
to this necessity, when a court interprets or confirms an agency’s statutory interpretation, the 
interpretation becomes static. Id. at 842. If an adjustment is necessary in the area where the court ruled, 
the agency cannot make that adjustment. See Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 536-37. Consequently, a 
judicial statement on one section of an enabling statute potentially disrupts the functioning of the entire 
system. 
 134. Mesa Verde Constr. Co., 861 F.2d 1135-36. A court will review the agency’s statutory 
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Because both Chevron and stare decisis are valid and useful, courts are 
unwilling to adopt firmly one doctrine at the expense of the other. Even 
courts that establish a doctrine in a specific case tend to leave open the 
option for future cases.135 These courts either expressly or implicitly 
acknowledge that they have a choice in which doctrine they apply.136 
Despite their apparent choice between the two doctrines, the courts of 
appeals decisions have generally followed a single path in deciding which 
doctrine to apply. Courts facing a decision that impacts the internal 
workings of a regulatory scheme or an individual’s liberty interest 
generally apply the Chevron doctrine with the goals of affording the 
agency flexibility and treating similar cases similarly, respectively.137 
Courts facing a decision that does not affect an individual’s liberty interest 
or that impacts merely a procedural aspect of the agency’s system, not an 
issue affecting the inner workings of the regulatory system, generally 
adhere to stare decisis.138 
Because both Chevron and stare decisis are useful doctrines, both 
continue in the judicial system. Courts adopt one doctrine over the other in 
specific cases, but are reluctant to do so on a broader scale. This practice 
eliminates all consistency from the law. Despite the emerging pattern of 
application, litigants are unable to know whether a circuit court of appeals 
will defer to the agency or follow its judicial precedent. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
When the Supreme Court has announced or confirmed a statutory 
construction, lower federal courts should adhere to stare decisis and follow 
that interpretation. In the absence of a Supreme Court interpretation, courts 
should defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their enabling 
statutes. This resolution to the conflict between stare decisis and Chevron 
interpretation if and when a litigant decides to file suit or pursue an appeal. See supra note 75. 
 135. See, e.g., Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317 (holding Chevron outweighs stare decisis “in this 
instance”) (emphasis added); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855 (considering both judicial precedent and agency 
amendments). 
 136. Supra note 135. 
 137. See, e.g., Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317; Joshua, 976 F.2d at 855; Michel, 206 F.3d at 262-63; 
Schisler, 3 F.3d at 568. But cf. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d at 147 (refusing to defer to agency in 
construing sentencing guidelines despite direct impact on defendant’s liberty). Although the Supreme 
Court expressly followed stare decisis in Neal, 516 U.S. at 295, a case directly impacting the 
defendant’s liberty, this result is appropriate under this standard because Supreme Court decisions 
necessarily achieve uniformity among the circuits. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 138. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376; BPS Guard Services, Inc., 942 
F.2d at 524. But cf. MLQ Investors, L.P. v. Pac. Quadracasting, Inc., 146 F.3d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(deferring to agency although only a financial interest at stake, not a liberty interest). 
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avoids the deceptive circumvention of clearly controlling judicial 
precedent that occurs in some circuits,139 and it allows the flexibility 
necessary to efficiently control regulatory systems.140 Moreover, although 
stare decisis promotes consistency in the law,141 habitual deference to 
agencies will also promote considerable consistency.142 When courts 
regularly defer to agencies, potential litigants will know that the agency’s 
statutory interpretation, not the court’s, is binding.143 
The practical distinctions between the Supreme Court and the lower 
federal courts support this resolution to the conflict. Because of their 
different roles in the judicial system, it is not inconsistent for the Supreme 
Court to follow judicial precedent while lower federal courts defer to 
agencies. Supreme Court decisions have uniformity, publicity, and finality 
that are lacking in the lower courts. 
The Supreme Court is the ultimate authority in the judicial system. Its 
interpretations are binding on all circuits and so provide uniformity in the 
law.144 The Supreme Court has discretion as to which cases it hears and 
can give full consideration to each case.145 The Court is most likely to hear 
issues that are especially important to the public or on which the circuits 
are split.146 Accordingly, cases before the Court are necessarily pressing 
 139. See supra notes 66, 73. 
 140. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863. This approach keeps the agencies free to run their systems so long 
as they do not overstep their congressionally defined boundaries. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 141. LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 7, at 8-17 (discussing changing nature of the common law). 
 142. See Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2244-45. Agency pronouncements that command deference 
involve rather public processes that give potential litigants notice and an opportunity to be heard. See 
generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.3, 8.2 (4th ed. 2002). If the 
agency interpretation changed through regular notice and comment rulemaking procedures, the 
individuals have notice of the new interpretation prior to their actions and therefore cannot argue that 
they did not know of the change. See id. § 7.3. Similarly, in agency adjudication, individuals have an 
opportunity to explain why they should not be bound by the new interpretation if it was not enacted 
prior to their actions. See id. § 8.2. Accordingly, through either avenue, individuals either have notice 
of the rule or have an opportunity to explain why the rule should not apply to them.  
 143. The public nature of agency lawmaking helps protect individuals’ reliance interest and 
resolve the problem of retroactivity noted in Viola Industries. See Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2244-
45. A “retroactive” decision is one that is applied to all cases pending at the time the decision is 
rendered. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 84 (4th ed. 1996). Supreme Court decisions are generally “non-retroactive,” 
applying to the case in which the decision is rendered and all future cases. 
 144. See Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1376 (noting that it is the Supreme Court’s 
responsibility to “harmoniz[e]” the circuits). 
 145. See Caldeira, Gregory A. & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1114-15, 1122 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter Agenda 
Setting]. Moreover, the publicity accorded to Supreme Court cases and the briefs submitted by 
interested organizations contribute to the completeness of the Court’s consideration. See infra notes 
149-50 and accompanying text. 
 146. Agenda Setting, supra note 145, at 1114 (finding that conflicts between circuits and between 
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questions of law that must be settled.147 These “high conflict” cases allow 
the Court to settle the law uniformly throughout the United States.148 
Circuit courts of appeals cannot settle an area of law or promote 
uniformity because their interpretations are not binding outside of their 
respective circuits. 
Moreover, because of the nature of its cases, Supreme Court decisions 
attract a lot of attention.149 Interested attorneys and organizations have an 
opportunity to participate in the litigation.150 This participation ensures the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations are fully informed. Circuit courts of 
appeals cases do not have the publicity and participation of Supreme Court 
cases and thus are likely not as fully informed. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s ability to settle the law lends its decisions 
a finality that lower court judgments do not have. Once the Court has 
interpreted a statute, only Congress or the Court itself can modify that 
interpretation.151 The finality of Supreme Court interpretations provides 
consistency in the law. This consistency safeguards potential litigants’ 
reliance on the law.152 
The publicity, full consideration, discretion and ability to settle an area 
of law found within the Supreme Court lend a finality to its statutory 
interpretations that is lacking in the lower courts. Because these 
protections exist only for the Supreme Court, the lower courts have less 
reason to adhere to stare decisis and more reason to defer to agency 
statutory interpretations than the Supreme Court. Importantly, these 
characteristics of Supreme Court interpretations also exist for agency 
statutory interpretations.153 Agencies, in the process of interpreting 
lower federal courts and the Supreme Court increase the likelihood that the Court will grant certiorari). 
 147. Id. at 1111, 1122. 
 148. See, e.g., Neal, 516 U.S. at 768-69 (describing Supreme Court decisions as producing 
“settled law”). Interestingly, the Mesa Verde court’s approach, by skirting Supreme Court authority, 
actually inhibits uniformity, despite that court’s purported goal of achieving uniformity. 861 F.2d at 
1135. See also supra note 49. 
 149. See Agenda Setting, supra note 145, at 1110-11. The Supreme Court hears high-conflict 
cases or cases of public importance. Id. 
 150. See id. at 1110 (explaining traditional opportunities for public participation in Supreme Court 
litigation).  
 151. Neal, 516 U.S. at 295-96. Moreover, if Congress or the Court changes the interpretation, it 
nevertheless remains uniform because both the Court and Congress have national jurisdiction. But cf. 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 121, at 58-68 (noting impact of interpreter’s frame of reference on statutory 
interpretations); Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An 
Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 396-99 (arguing that a goal of courts is to 
implement their policy preferences as law). Under these theories, Supreme Court interpretations may 
be less final than generally believed. 
 152. See Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2244-45 (noting stare decisis protects reliance interests). 
 153. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
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statutes, face conflicting policies and therefore must fully consider the 
issue.154 Furthermore, their decisionmaking processes necessitate public 
involvement.155 Thus, because agency interpretations have the same 
beneficial characteristics as Supreme Court interpretations,156 it is 
appropriate for circuit courts to give them deference despite conflicting 
circuit precedent. 
In summary, deference first to Supreme Court statutory interpretations, 
and in their absence to agency interpretations, protects the role of the 
judiciary, allows agencies necessary flexibility, and promotes certainty in 
the law for potential litigants. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is desirable and appropriate for federal courts, other than the United 
States Supreme Court, to defer to reasonable agency statutory 
interpretations despite conflicting circuit precedent. Deference to agencies 
promotes uniformity throughout the circuits, allows agencies to control 
efficiently their regulatory systems, and, when followed consistently, 
protects litigants’ reliance on the law at the time of action.157 Moreover, 
regular deference to agencies in the absence of Supreme Court precedent 
effects an efficient resolution to the current, inconsistent applications of 
stare decisis and the Chevron doctrine. 
Jennifer J. McGruther 
 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See generally PIERCE, supra note 142, at §§ 7.3, 8.2 (describing publicity requirements of 
agency rulemaking and opportunities to be heard in agency adjudication processes, respectively). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Reconciling, supra note 8, at 2258. 
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